

What PRC Leaders Say	What PRC Leaders Really Think
A. DIPLOMATIC PROPAGANDA	
CHARACTERIZING RELATIONSHIPS	
<p>“Win-Win Cooperation” (合作共赢)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperation that advances Beijing’s interests and narratives. The foreign counterpart is promised deliverables that either 1) benefit the PRC more, 2) sound better than reality, or 3) fail to materialize at all.
<p>“Friend of China” or “old friend of China” (老朋友); “You really understand China.”</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The foreign “friend’s” credibility, access, and relationships are useful in promoting PRC narratives abroad.
<p>Accusing a negotiating counterpart of “damaging the relationship” (破坏关系)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A negotiating tactic to put foreign interlocutors on the back foot by focusing on the relationship rather than whether or not the PRC has fulfilled prior commitments.
<p>“Community with a shared future for humanity,” aka “Community of Common Destiny for All Mankind” (人类命运共同体)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The <u>CCP’s utopian vision</u> of a future world where all nations recognize its wisdom and bend to its will; an umbrella concept expressing the ultimate goal of PRC <u>programs</u> such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative.
<p>“Harmony” // harmonize (和谐)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Part of the CCP’s efforts to promote the “construction” of a “harmonious society” (和谐社会). Noun: Everyone acting in accord with the CCP’s vision. Verb: Neutralizing dissent.
<p>“Mutual trust” (相互信任) and “mutual respect” (相互尊重)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Mutual trust,” for the PRC, is built when foreign counterparts set aside or delay pursuit of their own interests and prioritize friendly ties with China. This is most achievable with close allies, such as Russia. “Mutual respect” is a lesser version of this condition. The PRC uses this phrase to describe goals for relations with, e.g. the United States.
CHARACTERIZING DIALOGUES	
<p>“Candid/frank” (坦率) / “in-depth exchanges of views” (深入交换意见)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beijing wants to maintain the perception of welcoming multiple perspectives, while collecting as much information as possible and revealing as little as possible. It believes open-ended dialogues will stall the foreign counterpart’s decision-making process and delay foreign policies that are counter to PRC interests.
<p>“Warm/lively atmosphere (气氛热烈)” for exchange</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Saying nice things about China; agreeing with China’s positions.
<p>“Meet China halfway” (同中方相向而行)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A negotiating tactic that appeals to Americans’ sense of fairness – falsely claiming that the United States is being unfair in order to extract concessions.
B. GEOPOLITICS	
<p>The world is undergoing “great changes unseen in a century.” (百年未有的大变局)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CCP wants the world to think the United States is a declining power and China’s rise is unstoppable. It will seek to exploit perceived divisions among U.S. allies and partners to undermine U.S. leadership. But the CCP worries that the United States will reinvent itself and rise again, as it has many times in its history.
<p>“Cold War Mentality” (冷战思维)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characterizes U.S. foreign policy positions – particularly U.S. treaty alliances and explicit U.S. acknowledgment of “strategic competition – as outdated and hostile. This is despite the CCP having long perceived the United States as an adversary, but downplayed this fact in externally-focused propaganda during the “hide and bide” era.
<p>“<u>Dialogue and negotiation</u> are the only viable way out to resolve the Ukraine crisis.” Furthermore, “China <u>always upholds objectivity and fairness</u>, stands on the side of peace and justice, decides its own position according to the merits of the matter itself, and advocates that all countries should peacefully resolve international disputes...”</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Xi and Putin both see the United States and its democratic allies as a strategic threat and believe they have a historic opportunity to challenge the West. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts Beijing in an awkward position, but now that Russia has gotten itself stuck in a military quagmire, Beijing does not want to see Moscow lose. The PRC’s long-term interest is ensuring that any resolution to the crisis does not strengthen or expand NATO, since the U.S.-led alliance system is seen as a major constraint to Beijing’s long-term ambitions.
<p>The United States may face “serious consequences” (严重后果)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beijing will threaten unspecified retaliatory measures to deter potential U.S. policy moves (i.e., arms sales to Taiwan, export controls against PRC firms, military maneuvers in the South China Sea) in an attempt to paralyze decision-making in risk-averse elements of the U.S. government.
C. TECHNO-ECONOMIC ECOSYSTEM	
<p>China has a “vibrant [domestic] innovation ecosystem.” (充满活力的创新体系)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beijing has undertaken a multi-year political and regulatory campaign to reign in the power of China’s nominally “private” technology giants. PRC leaders worry about U.S. appeal to China’s leading innovators and technologists. The CCP has installed tighter supervision and control to ensure companies stay aligned with CCP ideology and policy objectives. The CCP views any rising domestic innovator as a potential threat to the Party and will put them in their place if they stray from CCP aims.
<p>“China <u>stands</u> ready to step up communication and exchanges on AI security governance with the rest of the world and help establish a widely accepted international AI governance framework, standards, and norms.”</p> <p>“We <u>believe</u> in a people-centered and ‘AI for good’ approach in regulating AI tech and participate in global cooperation in a highly responsible way.”</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The PRC <u>rejected previous DOD invitations</u> to engage in dialogue on AI and warfare. It sees no reason to constrain its military capabilities when it doesn’t have to. From Beijing’s perspectives, the United States is just trying to prevent the PRC from leapfrogging it with new capabilities. The CCP has the most advanced system of using AI to surveil and control China’s population and repress rights of speech, assembly, and religion. Many countries want what the CCP is selling and don’t subscribe to U.S. values. The PRC aims to lead the world in AI by 2030, displacing the United States.
<p>To shut out China in the name of “de-risking” is to <u>throw away opportunities, stability and development</u>. Such a move would only create and spread risks, and no one would benefit from it.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The PRC seeks to increase the world’s dependence on China for technology, while decreasing PRC dependence on the world. This predates the U.S. “decoupling” by many years. The PRC wants to do this at its own pace. When other countries take the initiative, the CCP gets nervous because it is out of Party control. The PRC will paint U.S. and EU “de-risking” and “diversification” moves as misguided efforts that will sink the global economy. In reality, China’s domestic economy is suffering amid falling <u>exports</u> and <u>FDI</u>.
<p>China will provide <u>strong momentum</u> for world economic recovery and growth by continuing to <u>reform and open its markets</u> to the world.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The PRC will continue to put pressure on foreign businesses to transfer technology in exchange for market access and threaten economic coercion if they publicly announce plans to diversify away from China. The PRC will leverage its domestic market to drive a wedge between Washington and U.S. industry. Although economic growth is <u>stagnating</u>, the PRC wants to project an image of dynamism and strength while <u>suppressing</u> negative economic news.