From Innovation to Overmatch: A Vision for the U.S. Military in the Age of Technological and Geopolitical Disruptions
Hello, I'm Ylli Bajraktari, CEO of the Special Competitive Studies Project. In this week's edition of 2-2-2, SCSP's Paul Lyons and Dave Zikusoka discuss how new technologies are transforming warfare, and how the United States military should adapt. For a more detailed discussion of these recommendations, see Pillar 2 of the Vision for Competitiveness, entitled "Agile Warfare: Mastering Speed and Scale for Strategic Advantage."
SCSP is excited about our upcoming AI+ Summit Series, a set of high-level events dedicated to enabling rapid advancements in artificial intelligence as it transforms our country and becomes a keystone of our national security.
The AI + Energy Summit, the first in this series, will take place on September 26, 2024, in Washington, D.C. The series will culminate with our next AI Expo and the Ash Carter Exchange on June 2-4, 2025. We hope to see you there!
Competition or Conflict? Four Battlefields as Prelude to the Future Fight.
The United States has a history of rising to existential challenges. We are approaching such a moment once again. America finds itself confronted with two powerful dynamics that will determine not only its global power and influence, but also the trajectory of the world order. The first are the sustained, geostrategic headwinds fanned by an Axis of Disruptors – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – that seek to upend the American-led, but open-to-all world order. The second is a powerful wave of emerging technologies, beginning with artificial intelligence, that will most certainly reshape societies, economies, and – importantly – the future of warfare. Militarily, these two dynamics are converging powerfully across four battlegrounds – for leadership in AI, in cyber and information domains, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. And while the outcome will be determined by sources of power that are not just military, the U.S. military’s ability to achieve overmatch in all four will be essential.
The Battle for Artificial Intelligence
Historically, technology has increased the speed, and scale of warfare. As AI permeates the battlespace, we can expect these trends to intensify and for the complexity of warfare to far outpace human cognition. The Chinese military – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – appears to have recognized this. It has committed to conducting “multi-domain precision warfare” that leverages big data and AI to rapidly identify and destroy key U.S. operational systems in all domains. The PLA and the Chinese Communist Party are also reorienting its military forces for this type of warfare, disbanding the Strategic Support Force and in its place empowering four forces, including an Information Support Force with the responsibility to manage the information systems and networks that will command and control future battles. Consistent with the Party’s intent to make China the world leader in AI by 2030, the PLA is matching its ambitions with real commitments; It is already spending, publicly at least, some 1-2% of its military budget in AI investments (compared to the Pentagon’s commitment of ~0.1%). In short, the PLA is moving ahead with a clear warfighting concept, institutional reorganizations, and financial commitments that reflect the increasing centrality of AI to the future of warfare.
The Battle for Cyberspace
Meanwhile, in the cyber domain, a Chinese “advanced persistent threat” has been detected in critical infrastructure networks of America. Known as Volt Typhoon, it is, in the words of FBI Director Christpher Wray, part of the “defining threat of our generation.” It is a systematic effort to exploit old software, outdated hardware, and stolen credentials to infiltrate the infrastructure control systems that make daily life in the United States possible. In the event of a crisis or conflict, Beijing could use Volt Typhoon’s embedded access to degrade or even destroy U.S. critical infrastructure. This same infrastructure is also vital to enabling the deployment and sustainment of the U.S. military abroad. Volt Typhoon, of course, is just the latest example of the Chinese state using cyber for strategic advantage against the United States, following a string of thefts of personal, commercial, and national security data, as well as vast troves of intellectual property. In short, China has moved to integrate cyberwarfare across the continuum of competition, crisis, and conflict.
The Battle for the Narrative
In the information domain, China and Russia have pursued aggressive information campaigns to sow division within our free and open society. These operations are having real-world consequences. Legions of bots, clandestinely state-backed WhatsApp and Telegram channels, and fake Facebook pages are poisoning America’s public square. U.S. troops were expelled from Niger thanks in part to a Russian disinformation campaign that fueled popular anger against their presence. Meta has discovered Chinese Facebook accounts that play up divisions in the fabric of U.S. society during elections. Both Russian and Chinese media have spread pro-Kremlin propaganda about the invasion of Ukraine, alleging, for example, that the massacre of civilians at Bucha was a false flag.
While Russia and China have weaponized information and used our platforms against us, the U.S. military continues to approach information warfare as a shared responsibility across the Services and with the interagency. The absence of a comprehensive approach to organizing, training, and equipping for the information warfare, and the lack of integration across the competition-crisis-conflict continuum presents challenges for a more concerted effort to counter malign foreign influence and hold at risk the information domains of our adversaries.
The Battle for Spectrum
The current and future spectral “terrain,” as demonstrated in Ukraine, will likely be congested, contested and constrained. Drones are lost by the thousands to electronic warfare (EW), U.S.-provided guided munitions veer off target, and command posts and logistic hubs that fail to control electromagnetic emissions are swiftly destroyed. The U.S. military depends heavily on consistent, reliable access to the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and in its ability to deny the enemy’s access to the same in combat. In wars past, the U.S. military has conducted combat operations in largely permissive electromagnetic environments that play to its advantages in reconnaissance and strike. However, China’s People’s Liberation Army – with its growing capabilities – envisions electronic warfare as an integrated component of a larger “system destruction warfare.” This warfighting concept is intended to, among other things, disrupt the U.S. military’s ability to form a common operating picture, move forces into theater, and command and control them. Russia, already a formidable electronic warfare adversary, is also gaining sophisticated, operational proficiency as part of its aggression against Ukraine.
A Vision to Compete
Faced with the emergence of an Axis of geopolitical Disruptors, the wave of new tech innovations, and the rapid transformation of the character of war, how should the United States respond? What existing institutions need to be reimagined and re-oriented to advantage our military? How do we plan, orchestrate, and execute military operations with precision, intensity, and reach? At a time of recruitment challenges, how can we train and attract a digital-savvy workforce to serve our nation?
In the SCSP’s latest report, A Vision for Competitiveness, we outlined a set of recommendations to address these challenges – and retain America’s military and innovation advantage:
Dominating the Spectrum
Integrated Warfare. The United States military must put in place a resilient, AI-powered, all-domain command and control architecture that aggregates information, integrates domains, leverages algorithmically-generated analysis, amplifies human cognitive abilities in planning and decision-making, delivers priority target nominations, and orchestrates attacks. The Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control that the Pentagon is already pursuing is a critical step in that direction, but the speed, reach, and complexity of the future fight demands even greater ambition, and much more automation. Specifically, it requires seamless integration of sensors and shooters, and automated target generation and weapons employment - though in clearly validated, geofenced engagement zones.
Digital Warfare. The speed and complexity of the future operating environment mandates better end-to-end integration not just from the strategic to the tactical, but within and between domains. This integration could start now between information and cyber domains, where our adversaries are waging asymmetric warfare on our critical infrastructure, intellectual property, critical research, and cognitive space. One possible approach is to integrate cyber, information, and electromagnetic spectrum missions within the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). This would also include the establishment of an Information Warfare Service that would uniformly organize, train, and equip personnel for the practice of digital warfare. Developing and training a digitally-ready workforce could also require a civilian Digital Service Academy that could provide undergraduate and specialized education for future federal workers, to prepare for the digital frontier. This institution’s mission would be to develop, educate, train, and inspire digital technology leaders and innovators and imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor, and service to the United States.
Commanding the future
Warfighting and Technological Supremacy in the Age of AI. At present, the responsibility within the Defense Department to assess the future battlespace, design and develop the force, experiment with novel capabilities, and acquire offsetting capabilities is disaggregated and fragmented. To earnestly innovate, adopt, and adapt at scale, and construct a joint future force, DoD should stand up a Joint Futures Command (JFC). As a direct report to the Secretary of Defense, the leader of the JFC would be chartered to scan the horizon and comprehend how new technologies will change the speed and character of warfare, provide prescriptions for the design of U.S. forces that are anticipatory and responsive to these changes, develop future concepts for employment of the force, and – critically – be resourced to acquire select emerging capabilities that are of joint use. Importantly, JFC could become a one-stop-shop for the private sector, academia, the investment community, and allies and partners to spur solutions to future joint and combined challenges.
Innovation as Armor. As threats undergo transformation in velocity, complexity, and reach, future conflicts are unlikely to be theater- or domain-specific. The U.S. military of the mid-decade, thus, must be tech-adroit to deter our adversaries. Prioritizing investment in critical technologies is a deterrence strategy unto itself. Furthermore, assuming a first mover advantage at the leading edge of warfare can undermine adversaries’ confidence in their investments, capabilities, and warfighting concepts. If harnessed appropriately by the DoD, AI and emerging technologies can underpin the Joint Force’s ability to deter opportunistic aggression and prevail across the spectrum of conflict. At the same time, DoD should also identify a set of attributes to guide the development of new warfighting concepts, beginning with accelerated decision-making, scalability, and adaptability, and then proceed to evolve the Joint Force to reflect them, and equip it with the capabilities that they demand.
The Crucible of Talent
Cultivating the Warriors of Tomorrow. Persistent and successful innovation requires the right people. This requires new thinking on human capital, emerging technologies, future warfighting concepts, and multi-domain challenges. As part of this rethink, the Department should establish digital career pathways within the Services that develop personnel with specialized technical expertise. Adequately upskilling all uniformed and civilian personnel for data- and AI-enabled operations should also be a top priority. DoD should further embrace the crossflow of talent from the private sector to national service. Existing programs like the Army’s 75th Innovation Command and the Marine Innovation Unit show that cross-pollination between DoD and the private sector is possible, and a pathway to providing mutual benefit. Ultimately, the private sector gains personnel with real, hard power experience in the dynamic landscape of agile warfare – and the fulfillment that comes with service to the nation.
Move to Interchangeability with Allies and Partners
Integrating on the Ground Floor. The complexity of the future fight will pressurize existing alliances and partnerships. This will become even more acute as AI adoption rates and sophistication among allies will likely vary. These challenges demand that the United States and its allies and partners be integrated in new and novel ways. Interoperability is no longer enough; integration and interchangeability are necessary to meet the complexities of future warfare. Therefore, compatibility across the AI stack will need to be ensured, preferably at the start, to enable future combined forces. In other words, AI and associated capabilities must be developed cooperatively with respective industrial bases working in tandem.
Conclusion
The battlegrounds of today are preludes to a complex future of warfare. The power to innovate at speed and relevance to the changing character of war will be the center of gravity and quintessential to our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat adversaries. Therefore, America must win this race for innovation power. It certainly has the track record, the key ingredients, and the people to do so. It just needs to move out with conviction, by retooling elements of our defense enterprise, reimagining how it commands and controls military operations, by translating AI progress into commanding lead, and by attracting, training, and retaining the right talent. America can secure the strategic advantage. It starts with a vision.
Fall rate 45% and comm failures 65% per joint commission,we need to fix using informatics otherwise it ll be too late and burden our hc.