From National Defense to National Competitiveness

Intelligence Consumers in the Digital Age

Hello, I’m Ylli Bajraktari, CEO of the Special Competitive Studies Project. In this edition of 2-2-2, Peter Mattis and Katie Kurata of the Intelligence Panel discuss the new frontier for the U.S. Intelligence Consumers.

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I am thrilled to announce that Mrs. Stephanie Carter and the Special Competitive Studies Project are convening the Ash Carter Exchange on Innovation and National Security on May 9, 2023, in Washington, DC. The purpose of the Exchange is to bring together pioneers and champions of innovation from the government, private sector, and scientific community to examine how to advance collaboration in pursuit of national security. This was one of the great legacies of Dr. Ash Carter, including when he served as the 25th Secretary of Defense.

Visit our website for information about speakers and how to attend. Stay tuned for more details in the weeks to come.

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From National Defense to National Competitiveness

“We serve the President.” This mantra is often repeated inside the halls of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at Langley, a constant reminder of the organization's focus on providing the highest quality intelligence to the senior-most level decision makers. As a former CIA counterintelligence analyst, I (Peter) recall this organizational focus on the top decision makers as both a sense of pride and exclusivity. 

But the intensity and the complexity of the new techno-economic competition that the United States is facing with China necessitates asking the question — is focus on the top still correct? Is it sufficient? Are there new players inside and outside the government, in the Executive and Legislative branches of our government, and among allies and partners — old and new — who should increasingly be treated as critical consumers of intelligence?

We think that the time has come to expand who the consumers of U.S. intelligence ought to be. We have already seen some expansion over the past decade, with detailed cyber-threat advisories. But this effort must now be radically expanded. In an age in which chip production, mobile network routers, sea port and airport management, AI algorithms, vaccine manufacturing, and quantum encryption are nearly as important as nuclear weapons development or testing of hypersonic missiles, America’s decision advantage increasingly hinges on the intelligence community’s ability to support a much broader consumer base.

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A Broader Frame for Intelligence

In the midst of a high-stakes, technology-focused, geopolitical rivalry with China, it is more important than ever for the Intelligence Community and key stakeholders — including the White House, Congress, and the Department of Defense — to take a hard look at how intelligence can best support American decision advantage. We believe this change should start in the Executive Branch and Congress, as a matter of urgency, but then expand to the private sector, the American public, and our allies and partners.

The President and the National Security Council will undoubtedly remain key intelligence consumers. However, the technological and economic aspects of the competition necessitate expanding the pool of important intelligence customers. The IC needs to give more emphasis to decision makers with economic and technology related portfolios, particularly those in the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Trade Representative, and organizations like the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. It is these entities that are at the forefront of the competition with China when it comes to microelectronics, scrutinizing inbound investments, implementing development projects in Latin America, Africa, or Pacific Islands, taking measures that seek to level the economic playing field, or identifying new frontiers of innovation, like artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, biopharmaceuticals, and next-generation networks. 

As the United States intensifies its approach to techno-economic competition, Congress will play a key role in authorizing and resourcing the U.S. actions and response. Every Congressional committee is likely to play some role - from agriculture, science, and education, to foreign relations. Therefore intelligence sharing should be broadened beyond the “Gang of Eight” and the Senate and House committees for Intelligence and Armed Services.

A more systematic and expanded engagement between the IC and the private sector is also a necessity. Private companies are now the leaders of innovation in America, and helping protect their intellectual property from Chinese economic espionage is critical to preserving our national positional advantage. Recently, the FBI’s Boston Division partnered with vaccine maker Moderna to encourage the private sector to work with them to address cyber threats. Continuing to build out relations like these not only for cybersecurity, but also economic security, is precisely the kind of information flow that U.S. decision makers need. 

In today's rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, the American public could also benefit from access to relevant intelligence, particularly when facing far-reaching national consequences. Just as with Congress, intelligence can be a powerful tool for building understanding and awareness of national security threats among both U.S. leaders and the public. Take, for example, the release of intelligence regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin's intentions to invade Ukraine and the warning of specific Russian actions like a false flag provocation, which alerted Americans to what was coming, dispelled misconceptions, undermined misinformation, and helped build early support for America’s response.

Lastly, maintaining strong intelligence cooperation with allies and partners is crucial for upholding U.S. and democracies’ advantage. The IC's foundation is built on working closely with partners, such as the "Five Eyes" collaboration and alliances like NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Sharing intelligence not only creates a shared awareness and fosters mutual understanding, but also nurtures a sense of common purpose and joint problem-solving. A prime example is how U.S. intelligence sharing about Huawei’s backdoors in its telecommunications equipment influenced allies' decisions regarding 5G equipment vendors. And we could be seeing something similar with TikTok now, and the concerns around data security and potential for misinformation.

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What is to be done?

The IC is adept at collecting and analyzing intelligence to support the senior-most decision makers. But the IC’s capabilities to find a terrorist or analyze a hypersonic missile — which we still need to do well — do not automatically carry over into understanding an evolving technology sector and its key individuals, companies, and networks. As with anything new, intelligence practitioners need to start by knowing first what challenges decision makers are confronting, the resulting decisions they face, and the information they need. That is the foundation for identifying what the IC should do, the data it needs to collect, and to whom it should disseminate its insights.

Conventional thinkers about intelligence will say that the IC cannot share intelligence in these ways without violating the law. In fact, federal statute and executive orders even recognize private entities as potential customers of U.S. intelligence. The IC would undoubtedly need to navigate privacy and administrative laws to protect civil liberties. But the President and the IC are not bound by any statute defining who should receive intelligence. In this context, it's essential to reevaluate existing norms to explore new ways of sharing intelligence that can better serve the nation's interests in an increasingly complex and competitive world.

One place to start, for instance, would be defining what constitutes a U.S. company and its contribution to national advantage, which is crucial in today's globalized world. The United Kingdom's National Protective Security Authority has taken a first step towards this, illustrating how governments can assist individuals and organizations in navigating foreign state threats. The United States can, and should, take similar steps to ensure its national security through partnerships, information sharing, and intelligence support. Let us learn from our allies and take the necessary steps to protect our citizens while upholding our values and principles.

The next steps toward making this possible will be making more information more readily moveable around the U.S. Government. The IC has traditionally focused on collecting and analyzing secret information. The need to make sense of troves of data to support the geopolitical and techno-economic competitions, however, places increasing importance on processing large quantities rather than just exquisite intelligence and addressing a broader set of intelligence consumers. To do so effectively requires embracing new digital tools and technologies, especially AI. The IC already has developed good strategies, but implementation continues to be uneven and ad hoc rather than systematic.

To leverage the information most relevant to today’s competition, SCSP identified a new open source agency and a National Techno-Economic Intelligence Center as two missing organizational elements. Both suggestions address the need for structures that can best serve as a bridge between the U.S. Government (including the IC) and private sector, ensuring that relevant publicly and commercially available information and expertise informs intelligence and decision making.

This also means publishing intelligence as a public service. Selective declassification or ad hoc preparation of public briefing materials can help shift the perception of intelligence from a political instrument to our best effort in making sense of complex issues. By sharing intelligence on topics like the risks associated with Chinese-owned technology platforms such as TikTok, the public and decision makers can gain a better understanding of the underlying issues and potential threats, avoiding a solely politically-driven narrative. 

Recent examples of selective declassification aimed at educating the public and business community about national security risks can be found in the bipartisan "Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology Act," or "RESTRICT" Act. By embracing a more transparent approach, the United States can empower its citizens with vital information while maintaining its competitive edge in the face of evolving techno-economic challenges.

As national security and techno-economic competition become increasingly intertwined, Americans need to think more broadly about intelligence and how it can support national advantage. The simplicity of the Cold War and the War on Terror is gone. It is time to rethink the fundamentals.